Title: Peer-driven Incentive Mechanisms
Crowdsourcing is an important component of the internet, with profound implications on the future of producing and consuming information. The commercial potential of harnessing the wisdom of the crowds is self-evident; unfortunately, effective mechanisms for quality control (i.e., spam filtering, encourage effort and truthfulness) are less understood. The economic theory offers a framework for designing explicit incentives (monetary or in-kind) able to encourage honest participation in some types of crowdsourcing applications. In this talk, I will survey a family of such incentive mechanisms that are "peer-driven", in the sense that truthfulness is measured against the collective information provided by a user's peers.
Radu Jurca obtained the Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL) in 2007. His thesis investigates mechanisms for rewarding truthful feedback in online systems, and was awarded the IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award (2007) and the EPFL's Best PhD Thesis Award (2008). Radu's research interests focus around the design of feedback and reputation mechanisms in social networks, crowdsourcing applications and other online systems where the information shared by individual participants cannot be verified by a trusted third party. Radu is currently working for Google in Zurich.